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THE ASSIGNMENT OF PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: EXPRESS
VERSUS AUTOMATIC ASSIGNMENT
In the years after the stock market crash of 1929, Congress enacted
statutes regulating the issuance and sale of securities, the Securities Act
of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).'
Congress directed the two statutes at the unfair and dishonest conduct of
securities underwriters and securities dealers that had contributed to the
stock market crash of 1929.2 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act (section 10(b))
1. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982). Prior to the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933
Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 47 of the 48 states had passed
"blue sky laws" discouraging corporations from engaging in speculative issuances of securities. L. Loss, SECtnURTss REGuLATION 18-19 (1951). State blue sky laws, however, did not
sufficiently protect investors in securities from the questionable practices of issuers of
securities because the state laws did not affect interstate business transactions, states often
lacked sufficient budgets or personnel to enforce their blue sky laws, and some of the state
blue sky laws contained so many exemptions that the laws were ineffective. See id. at 43,
56-58 (analyzing shortcomings of state blue sky laws).
In addition to the ineffectiveness of state legislation in addressing the issues of fraud
and deception in securities transactions, both a failed campaign for federal incorporation
and licensing legislation and government concern over fraudulent bond trading during World
War I contributed to a demand for federal legislation regulating securities. See id. at 58-66
(discussing factors before stock market crash of 1929 that pressured Congress to consider
legislation regulating securities). In 1929 the stock market crash prompted the Senate Banking
and Currency Committee to begin investigating securities trading and commercial and
investment banking. Id. at 75-76. President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote a letter to Congress
requesting legislation governing the issuance of securities and stressing the importance of
requiring full disclosure to the buying public of all important information regarding securities
issuances. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1933). Congress responded to
demands for legislation, first, by enacting the Securities Act of 1933, which addresses new
offerings of securities. See id. at 5 (scope of 1933 bill extends only to new offerings of
securities, not ordinary redistribution of securities). Second, Congress enacted the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which concerns the post-issuance trading of securities and authorizes
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to make and enforce rules governing fraud and
manipulation in the securities markets. L. Loss, supra, at 84-85.
2. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933). The abandonment by underwriters and dealers in securities of standards of fair, honest and prudent dealing made
possible the postwar flotation of fraudulent securities. Id.; see S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1934) (acknowledging that uncontrolled speculation by dealers in securities helped
cause stock market crash of 1929 and calling for regulation to protect public). In Congress'
report on the need for legislation regulating the sale of securities, Congress reported that,
in the decade after World War I, $25,000,000 worth of worthless securities entered the
market. H.R. RaP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). Congress accused underwriters
and dealers in securities of promising investors "easy wealth" without assisting investors in
estimating the value of securities. Id. Because of the resulting high demand for securities,
investment bankers and underwriters forced corporations unnecessarily to issue securities to
meet the demand. Id. Congress concluded that these unfair and dishonest actions led to the
inaccurate valuation of corporate properties and the flotation of essentially worthless
securities. Id.
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forbids the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance"
that violates the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).' Rule lob-5 of the SEC Rules (rule lOb-5), enacted
several years after the stock market crash, prohibits the use of fraudulent
devices or untrue statements of material facts by any person "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." ' 4 Although rule 10b-5 does not
expressly provide a remedy for violations of the rule's provisions, 5 in 1971
the United States Supreme Court held that the rule itself implies a private
right of action for alleged violations of the rule's provisions. 6 Subsequently,

3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). Section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act provides that no person lawfully may employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security, a manipulative or deceptive device that would violate any rules or
regulations that the SEC might prescribe. Id. One of the six primary purposes of Congress
in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the control of manipulative corporate
practices. H.R. RaP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934). By enacting provisions like
section 10(b), Congress intended to promote securities pricing based on the balance of
investment demand with investment supply. Id. at 10. Furthermore, Congress hoped to
discourage misleading statements on the value of securities and the purposeful marking up
or down of prices. Id.
4. Securities and Exchange Commission Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule
10b-5 provides that, in purchasing or selling securities, no person shall employ any "device,
scheme, or artifice" to defraud, make an untrue statement of a material fact, or omit a
material fact that is necessary to prevent the statements from being misleading. Id. Furthermore, rule lOb-5 prohibits all persons from engaging in any fraudulent or deceitful act,
practice, or course of business in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Id.
5. See id. (describing activities that shall be unlawful if conducted in connection with
purchase or sale of any security); H.

BLOOMENTHAL,
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(1987) (general fraud provision of rule 10b-5 does not provide express remedy for fraud).
6. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). In
Bankers Life the United States Supreme Court considered for the first time whether a private
corporation could base a claim against issuers of securities on violations of section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5 of the SEC Rules. Id. at 6. In Bankers Life the defendant,
Bankers Life & Casualty Company (Bankers Life), sold all of Manhattan Casualty Company's
(Manhattan) stock to Begole, a shareholder and director of Manhattan. Id. at 8. Begole
fraudulently paid for the Manhattan stock with Manhattan's assets. Id. To accomplish the
fraud on Manhattan, Begole procured a check from Irving Trust Company for the purchase
price of the Manhattan stock, although Begole had no funds on deposit with Irving Trust.
Id. On the same day that Begole purchased all of the Manhattan stock, Begole and several
other Manhattan directors installed a new president of Manhattan. Id. Under its new
President, Manhattan immediately sold United States Treasury bonds and deposited the
proceeds from the bonds sale and some cash in Manhattan's Irving Trust account. Id. Irving
Trust then charged Begole's original check for the purchase of the Manhattan stock against
the new deposit of proceeds from the sale of the United States savings bonds. Id. Despite
this depletion of Manhattan's assets, the Manhattan books did not show Begole's use of
the Manhattan assets to finance Begole's purchase of Manhattan securities. Id. at 8-9. The
plaintiff, Manhattan's liquidator, sued Bankers Life under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
alleging that Bankers Life defrauded Manhattan by selling the Manhattan securities to
Begole. Id. at 7. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed Manhattan's complaint, basing its decision on section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. See id. at 7 (discussing
lower courts' disposition of Bankers Life). Manhattan appealed the Second Circuit's decision
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in resolving a number of issues associated with rule lOb-5, the Supreme
Court held that only actual purchasers and sellers of securities may bring
damages actions under rule lOb-5. 7 The Supreme Court has not determined,

however, whether a purchaser or seller of a security who possesses a rule
lOb-5 right of action or another right of action under the 1933 or 1934
Acts either expressly or automatically assigns the right of action to a

subsequent purchaser of the security. Although the Supreme Court has
not decided the assignment issue, several lower federal courts have recognized the issue.8 A majority of the federal courts addressing the issue
to the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court granted Manhattan's writ of
certiorari. Id. at 9. The Supreme Court determined that section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, under
which employing any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities is unlawful, protected Manhattan as a seller of Treasury bonds. Id. The
Supreme Court found that the defendant injured Manhattan by fraudulently leading Manhattan into believing that Manhattan would receive the proceeds from the sales of the bonds.
Id. at 9-10. The Supreme Court reasoned that, because Bankers Life acted fraudulently in
connection with the sale of a security, section 10(b) provided a remedy for Manhattan. Id.
at 12. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's dismissal of Bankers
Life and remanded the case for trial. Id. at 13; see also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426, 432 (1964) (recognizing that private enforcement of SEC rules might become necessary
in addition to SEC action to enforce rules); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (concluding that plaintiff was intended beneficiary of statute and
therefore could maintain private action under rule lOb-5).
7. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (only actual
purchasers and sellers of securities may assert claims in private damages action under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5), rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975); infra notes 115-21 and
accompanying text (discussing facts and Supreme Court's reasoning in Blue Chip); see also
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.) (only actual purchasers and
sellers of securities may maintain private damages actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb5), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
8. See, e.g., In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 772 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1985)
(federal cause of action that arises from original security holder's reliance on misrepresentation does not follow security to remote purchaser who did not rely on misrepresentation);
Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 1207, 1209 (3d Cir.) (per curiam) (rule lOb-5
actions are assignable if owner expressly assigns rule lOb-5 action to subsequent purchaser
of owner's security), modification denied, 711 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
893 (1983); Soderberg v. Gens, 652 F. Supp. 560, 563-64 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (federal cause of
action does not attach automatically to security and pass to subsequent purchaser); Ciarlante
v. CSX Corp., 629 F. Supp. 534, 537 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (federal law does not provide for
automatic assignment of federal securities laws claims); In re Saxon Sec. Litig., 644 F.
Supp. 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (assignment of rule lob-5 right of action to subsequent
purchaser does not occur automatically); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562
F. Supp. 1180, 1188 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (because only defrauded purchasers and sellers may
bring actions under rule lOb-5, purchaser of security who does not allege fraud does not
acquire rule lob-5 right of action by automatic assignment); Independent Investor Protective
League v. Saunders, 64 F.R.D. 564, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (right of action belonging to
defrauded security holder does not travel automatically to subsequent purchaser of security,
even if subsequent purchaser was victim of fraud); International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (rule lOb-5 actions for
remedial damages are assignable); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 761-62 (D.N.J.
1955) (because at common law nonpersonal and nonpenal damages actions were assignable,
rule lOb-5 remedial damages actions survive security holder's death and are assignable).
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of assignment of securities law causes of action has decided that, although

an action under the securities statutes does not travel automatically with
a security to a subsequent purchaser, an owner of a security expressly

may assign the owner's securities law claim to a subsequent purchaser. 9
Addressing the issue of the assignment of a rule lOb-5 cause of action
in Lowry v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,lO the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether purchasers of convertible
debentures of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company (B & 0) could

assert the section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims of previous owners of the
debentures." In Lowry the plaintiffs, who had purchased debentures from

previous debentureholders, claimed that the previous debentureholders
automatically had assigned their section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 claims to the

plaintiff purchasers of the debentures. 12 In considering the plaintiffs' claim
of automatic assignment, the Lowry court first examined the facts upon
which the previous owners had based their section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
causes of action.

3

The court in Lowry noted that the previous debenture-

holders had purchased their debentures from B & 0 at a time when B &
O owned rail and nonrail assets.

4

The debentures thus were convertible

into common stock representing both the rail and nonrail assets of B &
0.15 After the previous debentureholders purchased their debentures, B &

O transferred all of its nonrail assets to Mid-Allegheny, a subsidiary
corporation of B & 0.16 On December 13, 1977, B & 0 declared a stock

9. See, e.g., In re Saxon Sec. Litig., 644 F. Supp. 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (under
limited circumstances, owner of securities expressly may assign rule lOb-5 cause of action
to subsequent purchaser, but assignment of rule lob-5 cause of action does not occur
automatically); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1189
(W.D. Mo. 1983) (some act by seller of security in addition to sale of security must occur
for seller effectively to assign rule lOb-5 cause of action to subsequent purchaser); Independent Investor Protective League v. Saunders, 64 F.R.D. 564, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(recognizing support for express assignability of rule lOb-5 causes of actions, but finding
no support for automatic assignment of rule lOb-5 causes of action).
10. 707 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.), modification denied, 711 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 893 (1983).
11. Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 722 (3d Cir. 1983).
12. Id.
13. See id. (discussing action against B & 0 by original debentureholders that preceded
plaintiffs' action in Lowry); see also Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R.,
680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.) (action by original convertible debentureholders against B & 0,
alleging violation of rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 476 (1982).
14. See Lowry, 707 F.2d at 722 (noting that, while owning rail and nonrail assets, B
& 0 issued both common stock and convertible debentures); see also Pittsburgh Terminal
Corp. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933, 936 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 103
S.Ct. 476 (1982).
15. See Lowry, 707 F.2d at 722 (before creation of subsidiary corporation, MidAllegheny, B & 0 debentureholders could convert debentures into common stock that
represented both B & O's rail and nonrail assets).
16. Id.; see also Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 680 F.2d
933, 936 (3d Cir. 1982) (discussing B & O's transfer of B & 0 nonrail assets to MidAllegheny Corporation). Because B & 0 owned rail assets, the Interstate Commerce Con-
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dividend, distributing all of the Mid-Allegheny stock to B & 0 common
stockholders.' 7 In distributing the Mid-Allegheny stock, B & 0 failed to
give notice of the distribution to B & 0 convertible debentureholders.18
Because B & 0 failed to give notice of the stock dividend to the debentureholders, the convertible debentureholders were unable to convert their
debentures to common stock before B & 0 distributed the Mid-Allegheny
stock dividend.' 9 Thus, although at the time the previous holders had
purchased their debentures, the debentures were convertible into common
stock representing B & O's rail and nonrail assets, after December 13 the
debentures were convertible into common stock representing only B & O's
rail assets. 20 Accordingly, prior to the Lowry action, the previous debentureholders brought an action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act against
B & 0 in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. 2' In their action against B & 0, the previous debentureholders alleged that B & O's distribution of Mid-Allegheny common stock
to B & 0 common stockholders constituted a fraud on the previous
debentureholders because B & 0 had failed to notify the debentureholders
of the distribution to common stockholders. 22 On appeal, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that the previous debentureholders had a
private right of action against B & 0 under section 10(b) and rule lOb-

mission regulated all of B & O's assets. Pittsburgh Terminal, 680 F.2d at 936. Therefore,
to avoid Interstate Commerce Commission regulations that prohibited a railroad corporation
from pursuing nonrail ventures, B & 0 had created a wholly owned subsidiary, MidAllegheny Corporation. Id. By transferring B & O's nonrail assets to Mid-Allegheny, B &
O could allow Mid-Allegheny, a nonrail corporation, to develop B & O's nonrail assets
without having to comply with ICC regulations. Id.
17. Lowry, 707 F.2d at 722. By distributing the Mid-Allegheny stock as a dividend to
B & O's common stockholders, B & 0 avoided registering Mid-Allegheny's stock dividend
with the SEC. See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 936
(3d Cir. 1982) (discussing B & O's reluctance to register Mid-Allegheny stock with SEC).
18. Lowry, 707 F.2d at 722. The Restructuring Committee for B & 0 determined that,
to avoid registering Mid-Allegheny Corporation with the SEC, B & 0 would not give notice
to B & 0 convertible debentureholders of the Mid-Allegheny stock distribution. See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 936 (3d Cir. 1982) (discussing
B & O's reluctance to register Mid-Allegheny with SEC). The Restructuring Committee
reasoned that, if convertible debentureholders knew of the impending stock dividend to B
& 0 common stockholders, the convertible debentureholders would exercise their right to
convert to common stock. Id. If the number of B & 0 common stockholders rose sharply
just prior to the Mid-Allegheny distribution, the Committee concluded, the SEC would
require that B & 0 register Mid-Allegheny's securities. Id.
19. Lowry, 707 F.2d at 722.
20. Id.
21. See id. (discussing action of original debentureholders against B & 0 for violations
of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5); see also Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & 0.
R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 935 (3d Cir. 1982) (discussing plaintiffs' allegation that B & O's stock
dividend without notice to convertible debentureholders violated federal securities laws).
22. See Lowry, 707 F.2d at 722 (discussing plaintiffs' claims in Pittsburgh Terminal);
see also Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 939 (3d Cir.)
(discussing original B & 0 convertible debentureholders' action against B & 0), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 476 (1982).
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The plaintiff class in Lowry consisted of debentureholders who after

23. See Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 722 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing
holding in Pittsburgh Terminal); see also Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & 0.
R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 943 (3d Cir.) (by failing to give notice of impending stock dividend, B
& 0 defrauded convertible debentureholders), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 476 (1982).
In Pittsburgh Terminal the plaintiffs, Pittsburgh Terminal Corporation and Monroe
Guttmann, held B & 0 debentures, which were convertible at any time before maturity into
ten shares of B & 0 common stock for each $1000 of face value of the debentures. Pittsburgh
Terminal, 680 F.2d at 935. In the indenture applying to the plaintiffs' debentures, B & 0
agreed not to declare or pay any stock dividend on B & 0 common stock without giving
general notice of the record date of the distribution. Id. at 936-37. Additionally, B & O's
listing agreement with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stipulated that B & 0 promptly
would publish to the holders of B & 0 securities any dividend action that B & 0 might
take, allowing security holders a "proper period" in which to exercise their rights in the
securities. Id. at 937. Last, the Rules of the NYSE also governed the activities of B & 0.
Id. The Rules provide that corporations listed with the NYSE must release to the public
any information that reasonably might affect materially the market for the corporation's
securities. Id. In Pittsburgh Terminal the plaintiff, Monroe Guttmann, a B & 0 convertible
debentureholder, requested that B & 0 promptly notify convertible debentureholders of a
dividend declaration so that the convertible debentureholders would have sufficient time to
exercise their conversion option and receive the stock dividend as common stockholders. Id.
In November 1977, B & 0 replied to Guttmann that B & 0 promptly would disseminate to
the general public any information concerning dividend action on B & 0 stock. Id.
B & 0 declared a dividend, payable in stock of B & O's subsidiary, Mid-Allegheny
Corporation, to B & 0 common stockholders on December 13, 1977. Id. at 938; see also
supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (discussing B & O's transfer of nonrail assets and
subsequent stock dividend declaration). B & 0, however, failed to notify the convertible
debentureholders that B & 0 was declaring a dividend. Pittsburgh Terminal, 680 F.2d at
938. The plaintiffs maintained an action against B & 0 in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that B & O's stock dividend of December
13, 1977, violated section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5 by depriving debentureholders
of the opportunity to convert their debentures into shares of common stock before the
record date and to participate in the stock dividend of December 13. Id. at 935. The district
court recognized that the plaintiffs had standing to sue B & 0 but rejected each of the
plaintiffs' claims, reasoning that B & 0 had a legitimate business purpose in declaring the
stock dividend without giving notice to convertible debentureholders. Id. at 942.
On appeal, the Third Circuit first determined that B & 0 had a duty to notify B & 0
conVertible debentureholders of the impending stock dividend to B & 0 common shareholders. Id. at 940-42. In finding that B & 0 had a duty to notify, the Pittsburgh Terminal
court first reasoned that the NYSE listing agreement affirmatively required B & 0 to give
B & 0 security holders an opportunity to exercise their rights in their securities if B & 0
declared and paid a dividend. Id. at 941. Second, the Pittsburgh Terminal court found that
B & 0 had a similar affirmative duty under SEC Rule 10b-17, which states that failure to
give notice of a dividend or other distribution in cash or in kind shall constitute a
"manipulative or deceptive device." Id.
After finding that B & 0 had a duty to notify the plaintiffs of the stock dividend of
December 13, the Pittsburgh Terminal court determined that B & 0 knowingly and intentionally timed the distribution of Mid-Allegheny shares to avoid giving notice to the
convertible debentureholders. Id. at 942. Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that the
plaintiffs satisfied the scienter requirement of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Id. Accordingly,
the Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court in Pittsburgh Terminal, holding
that by failing to notify the plaintiffs of the stock dividend of December 13, B & 0 violated
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id. at 943.
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December 13 had purchased convertible debentures from the previous
debentureholders 4 The plaintiff class in Lowry claimed that the previous
debentureholders automatically had assigned their section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 causes of action to the subsequent purchasers of the debentures. 2
Thus, the plaintiff class in Lowry asserted against B & 0 the rule lob-5
6
claims of the original B & 0 debentureholders.2
Six of the eight judges sitting en banc in Lowry agreed with the
plaintiff class that a security holder who possessed a rule lOb-5 cause of
action could assign the cause of action to a subsequent purchaser of the
security.27 The six judges, however, disagreed over whether the possessor
of a rule lob-5 cause of action automatically assigns his cause of action
to a subsequent purchaser of the security or whether the possessor expressly
must assign the cause of action to a subsequent holder of the security. 28
Two judges in a concurring opinion determined that courts should permit
only security holders that have suffered fraud themselves or that are
29
express assignees of defrauded holders to maintain rule lob-5 actions.
The concurring judges noted that the securities laws have a remedial
purpose and that, by enacting the securities laws, Congress intended to
provide a remedy to individuals injured by fraud. 0 Thus, the concurring
judges reasoned that a rule permitting only defrauded security holders and

24. Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 722 (3d Cir. 1983).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 729-32, 734-47.
28. Id. Five of the eight judges who participated in the Lowry decision joined the
decision to dismiss the plaintiff class' federal causes of action against B & 0. Id. at 723.
Three of the five judges in favor of the dismissal, however, acknowledged that if the
December 13 debentureholders expressly had assigned their rule lOb-5 causes of action to
the subsequent purchasers of the debentures who constituted the plaintiff class, the plaintiff
class in Lowry would have had a valid claim against B & 0 under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5. See id. at 729 (Garth, J., concurring) (absent express assignment of federal securities
law causes of action to subsequent purchasers, subsequent purchasers may not assert federal
claims of previous owners of securities); infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (discussing
reasoning behind determination of concurring judges that security holders expressly may
assign rule 10b-5 causes of action to subsequent purchasers). The remaining three judges
who participated in the Lowry decision dissented from the Third Circuit's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' federal claims, determining that rule lob-5 causes of action travel automatically
to subsequent purchasers of securities. See Lowry, 707 F.2d at 739 (Gibbons, J., dissenting)
(decisions of federal courts holding that section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims freely are
assignable are well supported by federal case law); infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text
(discussing reasoning behind determination of dissenting judges in Lowry that rule lob-5
causes of action travel automatically to subsequent purchasers of securities).
29. Lowry, 707 F.2d at 729 (Garth, J., concurring). In Lowry, Judge Sloviter joined
Judge Garth's concurring opinion. Id. at 723.
30. See id. (Garth, J., concurring) (remedial purposes of securities laws demand that
compensation for securities fraud must inure to individuals injured by fraud, not to corporate
bounty hunters); see also S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934) (purpose of 1934
Act was to provide remedy for investors that suffered injury from unfair methods of
speculation in securities transactions prior to and during stock market crash).
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their express assignees to bring a rule lOb-5 action supports the congressional purpose behind rule lOb-5 more effectively than a rule permitting
automatic assignment. 3 Accordingly, the concurring judges examined

whether B & O's stock distribution actually injured the plaintiff class in
Lowry.3 2 The concurrence noted that the price which the plaintiffs in
Lowry paid for the debentures reflected the decrease in the debentures'
value that resulted from B & O's transfer of nonrail assets to MidAllegheny.33 The concurring judges reasoned that, because the plaintiff
class had knowledge of the Mid-Allegheny stock distribution and because

the price of the debentures reflected the decrease in the value of the
debentures, the class suffered no loss or injury as a result of purchasing
the B & 0 debentures.3 4 The concurrence concluded that, to allow subsequent purchasers that suffered no loss from B & O's fraudulent conduct

to recover under rule lOb-5 in the absence of an expression of the seller's
intent to assign his cause of action to the purchasers would defeat the
5
remedial purpose underlying the securities laws.
Although the concurring judges in Lowry were in favor of recognizing
only express assignments of rule lOb-5 causes of action, three judges
dissenting from the majority opinion in Lowry asserted that owners of

securities automatically assign their section 10(b) actions to subsequent
purchasers of the securities. 36 The dissent determined that rule lOb-5 claims

31. Lowry, 707 F.2d at 729.
32. See id. (whether plaintiff class in Lowry suffered injury depends upon whether
price that plaintiff class paid for B & 0 convertible debentures reflected fraud on previous
debentureholders).
33. See id. (recognizing that post-December 13 prices reflected dilution in value of B
& 0 convertible debentures that B & O's corporate restructure caused). According to the
concurrence in Lowry, after B & 0 declared the distribution of Mid-Allegheny stock to B
& 0 common stockholders on December 13, the convertible debentures, once convertible
into common stock representing both rail and nonrail assets of B & 0, were convertible
into stock representing only rail assets of B & 0. Id. Because the B & 0 convertible
debentures represented an option to acquireless valuable common stock after December 13,
B & O's transfer of its nonrail assets to Mid-Allegheny diluted the value of the B & 0
convertible debentures. Id. In addition, the concurrence noted that, because the subsequent
purchasers of the debentures knew of the stock dividend and transfer of nonrail assets, they
must have paid a lower price than the original debentureholders paid for the debentures.
Id.
34. Id.

35. Id. One of the three concurring judges in Lowry agreed with the concurring opinion
of the other two judges and, in a separate concurrence, also asserted that federal law does
not allow the automatic assignment of federal securities law causes of action. Id. at 732
(Adams, J., concurring).
36. See id. at 734-48 (Gibbons, J., and Seitz, J., dissenting) (determining that federal
securities law claims automatically are assigned to subsequent purchasers of securities). In
Lowry Chief Judge Seitz wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, which Judge Becker
joined. Id. at 748. The dissenting judges in Lowry first determined that previous federal
cases had stablished that actions for damages under federal securities laws are freely
assignable. See id. at 739 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (decisions establishing that federal
securities law claims are assignable achieve purpose behind federal securities laws by
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must be freely transferable to achieve the rule's underlying policy of

protecting security holders from manipulative or deceptive acts or practices
of sellers of securities.37 The dissent reasoned that because not all security

holders can afford the expense and delay of a rule lOb-5 action, security
holders should be able to sell their securities and their causes of action in
the market.38 Furthermore, the dissenting judges suggested that, assuming
39
that federal common law determines whether an assignment has occurred,

the federal common law of assignability of securities fraud claims must

protecting investors from manipulative or deceptive practices); see also Western Auto Supply
Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 739-41 (8th Cir. 1965) (surviving corporation
after merger assigned right of action under § 16 of 1934 Act to purchaser corporation),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. Shields
& Co., 209 F. Supp. 145, 149-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (remedial damages actions under § 10(b)
of 1934 Act survive holder's death and are assignable); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp.
753, 761 (D.N.J. 1955) (because common law tests of assignability and survivability are
same, remedial damages actions that survive death are assignable).
37. Lowry, 707 F.2d at 739 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 739-40 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 740 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). In determining which law governs the assignment of federal securities law causes of action, the dissenting judges in Lowry queried, first,
whether state or federal law governs the assignment of federal securities law causes of
action. Id. Although the dissent cited ample support for the applicability of state law to
questions concerning the transferability of property, the dissent assumed for the sake of
argument that federal common law decides the issue of assignment of federal securities law
claims. Id. Second, the dissenting judges explored whether the federal common law provides
a uniform rule of assignment of federal securities law claims or whether courts should
determine the federal common law according to the law of the state in which the sale of
the securities occurred. Id. at 740-42. The dissent determined that applying the law of the
state to the issue of assignment does not frustrate the federal government's objective of
protecting the securities market from manipulative and deceitful practices. Id. The dissent
explained that, because state law will determine only the assignment issue, the victim of
fraud or his assignee still will be able to obtain a federal remedy for the fraud. Id. at 741.
Additionally, the dissent reasoned that a federal rule on assignment of federal securities law
claims would disrupt commercial relationships founded in state law because many states
have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which provides for the automatic
transfer from seller to buyer of all rights that the seller possesses. Id. at 741-42; see also
N.Y. [GENERAL OBLIGAnONs] LAW § 13-107 (McKinney 1978) (transfer of bond vests in
transferee all claims or demands of transferor for damages or rescission); N.Y. [UNIFoRM
COMMERCIAL CODE] LAW § 8-301 (McKinney 1964) (upon delivery of security, purchaser
acquires all rights in security that transferor had or had authority to convey); but see Licht
v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., No. 24560/82, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept.
1983) (holding that seller of security does not automatically transfer his state law claims
when he sells a security). Finally, assuming arguendo the need for a uniform federal rule,
the dissenting judges questioned whether state law, nevertheless, should define the national
consensus on the issue of assignment of federal securities law claims. Lowry, 707 F.2d at
742-43. Because adopting the rule of the UCC would provide uniformity, the dissent
concluded that the New York and UCC rules sufficiently represent the consensus of the
commercial world on the assignment issue. Id. By this process of reasoning, the dissent
concluded that state law should govern the assignment of federal securities law claims, but
that, even if the federal common law governs the assignment issue, state law should define
the content of the federal common law. Id.
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reflect the law of the state in which the buyer purchased the security. 40
Because the convertible debenture sale in Lowry occurred in New York,
the dissent determined that a New York state law that provides for the
automatic assignment of accrued causes of action to subsequent purchasers
in bond and debenture transactions governed the debenture sale in Lowry.4'
The dissent noted, therefore, that the original holders of the B & 0
debentures automatically assigned their rule lob-5 rights to the subsequent
purchasers of the debentures.4 2 The dissenting judges in Lowry concluded
that the Third Circuit should remand the case to the lower court for
43
further proceedings consistent with New York law.
In addition to asserting that the Third Circuit should recognize a rule
of automatic assignment, two of the three dissenting judges recognized
that security holders often'will sell their securities before investors discover
fraud and the ground for a rule lob-5 action. 44 Thus, the two judges
determined that, by recognizing a rule of auomatic assignment of securities
fraud claims, courts will give fraud claims to the subsequent holders of
45
the securities, who are the parties most likely to discover the fraud claims.
The two dissenting judges reasoned that in giving the claim to the investor
who discovers the fraud, courts most effectively will realize the goal behind
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the deterrence of manipulative and deceptive
practices in the exchange of securities. 46 Additionally, the two dissenting
judges recognized that most securities transactions occur in a market in
which buyers and sellers never meet. 47 The two dissenting judges noted
that, in a market in which buyers and sellers of securities never meet, the
4
parties never have the opportunity to negotiate an express assignment. 1
Therefore, according to the two dissenting judges, a rule requiring the
seller of a security expressly to assign his rule lob-5 claims seriously would
curtail the effectiveness of rule lOb-5 claims and fail to achieve the
maximum fraud deterrence that Congress intended section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 to have. 49

40. Lowry, 707 F.2d at 742-43; see supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing
reasoning behind Lowry dissent's assertion that state law should define federal common law
on issue of assignability of federal securities law claims).
41. Lowry, 707 F.2d at 742-43 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); see supra note 39 and
accompanying text (discussing reasoning behind dissent's conclusion in Lowry that state law
governed assignment of 10b-5 action); see also N.Y. [GENERAL OBLIGATIoNs] LAW § 13-107
(McKinney 1978) (transfer of bond vests in transferee all claims or demands of transferor
for damages or rescission).
42. Lowry, 707 F.2d at 742 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 743-44.
44. Id. at 746 (Seitz, J., concurring and dissenting). In Lowry Judge Becker joined
Chief Judge Seitz's opinion. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Other courts addressing the issue of the assignability of federal secu-

rities law causes of action have been less divided than the Lowry court
on the questions of express and automatic assignment.5 0 For example, in
In re Nucorp Energy Securities Litigation-" the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether Nucorp debentureholders
automatically assigned their actions for breach of trust under the Trust
Indenture Act (TIA) to the plaintiffs, who were subsequent purchasers of

Nucorp debentures.5 2 In Nucorp Continental Illinois Bank and Trust

Company of Chicago (Continental) acted as indenture trustee for holders

of convertible debentures of Nucorp Energy, Inc. (Nucorp), who purchased
debentures on and after October 1, 1981. 51 On January 20, 1982, Nucorp

4
publicly announced that Nucorp was experiencing financial difficulties.1
In an action that preceded Nucorp, Nucorp debentureholders who held

the debentures between October 1, 1981, and January 20, 1982, charged

Continental with breach of trust in violation of the TIA for knowing or
having reason to know that Nucorp's disclosure documents supporting
Nucorp's January 20 announcement were materially misleading."s The
plaintiffs in Nucorp were Nucorp debentureholders who after January 20
had purchased Nucorp debentures from the October-January debenture-

50. See infra notes 51-84 and accompanying text (discussing courts' similar reasoning
in In re Nucorp Securities Litigation and Soderberg v. Gens); see also In re Nucorp Sec.
Litig., 772 F.2d 1486, 1493 (9th Cir. 1985) (claim under federal Trust Indenture Act did
not travel automatically with security); Soderberg v. Gens, 652 F. Supp. 560, 566 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (owner of security did not automatically assign cause of action under § 10(b) of 1934
Act to subsequent purchaser of security).
51. 772 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1985).
52. In re Nucorp Energy See. Litig., 772 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1985). The Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA) is a companion statute to the Securities Act of 1933. Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1982); see L. Loss, supra note 1, at 94
(TIA operates in conjunction with registration requirements of Securities Act of 1933). The
TIA requires that companies issuing debt securities such as bonds or debentures prepare
and file with the SEC a document known as an "indenture," defining the rights of the
holders of the debt securities that the company issues. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15
U.S.C. §§ 302, 304(a)(9), 305(a). The TIA also requires trustees under indentures to protect
and enforce the rights of the debt security holders. Id. § 315; see L. Loss, supra note 1, at
94 (purpose of TIA is to provide for trustees who will protect holders of bonds and
debentures that corporation issues under TIA). Under the TIA, holders of bonds and
debentures may maintain actions against indenture trustees for breach of trust. Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(d) (1982); see Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace
Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 434 (1971) (trustee under Chapter X of Bankruptcy Act may not
assert debentureholder's claim under TIA for breach of trust); Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Bloom,
200 F.2d 627, 633 (8th Cir. 1953) (terms of indenture will determine rights of bondholders);
Ray v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 35 N.Y.2d 147, 156, 359 N.Y.S.2d 28, 33, 316
N.E.2d 320, 323 (1974) (holding that class action on behalf of debentureholders claiming
breach of trust under TIA was proper).
53. Nucorp, 772 F.2d at 1488.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 1488 (discussing action by original debentureholders against Continental
that preceded Nucorp).
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holders. 5 6 The Nucorp plaintiffs brought a separate class action for breach
of trust against Continental, claiming that the October-January debentureholders automatically assigned their TIA causes of action to the Nucorp
7
plaintiffs when the Nucorp plaintiffs purchased the Nucorp debentures.1
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California
dismissed the plaintiffs' federal claims for failure to state a claim for
which a court could grant relief.58 The plaintiffs appealed the district
court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
59
Circuit.
In determining that the October-January debentureholders had not
automatically assigned their TIA claims to the plaintiffs in Nucorp, the
Ninth Circuit noted that federal law governs issues arising under the TIA,
which is a federal statute. 60 The Nucorp court recognized that purchasers
of indentured securities have a cause of action under the TIA only if the
purchasers relied on the misleading statements and omissions of the issuers
of the indentured securities and suffered actual damages. 61 Therefore, the
Nucorp court reasoned that a cause of action under the TIA is personal
to injured purchasers of securities and does not automatically travel with
the securities to a subsequent purchaser who did not rely on the misrepresentations of the issuers. 62 The Nucorp court noted that to recognize the

56. Id. at 1488.
57. Id. In In Re Nucorp Securities Litigation the plaintiff, the Phelps Committee,
represented convertible debentureholders who bought Nucorp debentures from security
holders who had held the debentures before January 20, 1982. Id. The security holders from
whom the Nucorp plaintiffs bought their debentures, therefore, had been members of the
plaintiff class in the original action against Continental for breach of the TIA. Id.
58. Id. In dismissing the plaintiffs' federal claims on the merits, the district court in
Nucorp agreed with the defendant, Continental, that because the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that Continental had violated the TIA and because the plaintiffs had suffered no
injury from the materially misleading indenture documents, the plaintiffs had no cause of
action against Continental for breach of the trust agreement. Id. The district court in
Nucorp also dismissed the plaintiffs' state claims, concluding that the plaintiffs had failed
to show that Continental had violated any state laws. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1489; see Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1982);
supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing TIA). In determining that federal law
governed the plaintiffs' claims in Nucorp, the Ninth Circuit noted that the TIA is part of
the Securities Act of 1933. In re Nucorp Sec. Litig., 772 F.2d, 1486, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985).
The Nucorp court reasoned that, as a securities statute, the TJA shares the policy behind
the Securities Act of 1933 of protecting investors. Id. Because the TIA is a federal statute
and invokes considerations of federal policy and because other federal courts have relied
on federal law when determining whether federal securities law claims are assignable, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that federal law governed the issue of the assignability of a cause
of action under the TIA. Id.
61. In re Nucorp Sec. Litig., 772 F.2d, 1486, 1489-90 (9th Cir. 1985).
62. Id. at 1490; see also Independent Investor Protective League v. Saunders, 64
F.R.D. 564, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (rights of individuals that have suffered injury do not
attach forever to security). Unlike the Third Circuit in Lowry, the Nucorp court did not
distinguish between express and automatic assignment of rights of action. Nucorp, 772 F.2d
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plaintiffs' cause of action would take the action from the defrauded parties
and "gratuitously" transfer the cause of action to parties who were not
victims of the issuer's fraud. 63 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court and held that sellers of indentured securities
do not automatically assign their causes of action to subsequent purchasers.64

In a recent case, the United States District Court for the Northern
65
District of Illinois followed the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Nucorp.
In Soderberg v. Gens66 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois considered whether the right to sue under section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5 of the SEC Rules for rescission of a
security transaction is automatically assignable to a subsequent holder of
a security. 67 In Soderberg the plaintiff was the widow of John Soderberg,

who had been the controlling shareholder of Copco Corporation (Copco),
which owned all the stock of the Constitutional Casualty Company (Constitutional). 68 Upon John Soderberg's death, his shares in Copco passed
to a trust, of which Soderberg's widow, the plaintiff in Soderberg, and
his daughters were beneficiaries and cotrustees. 69 After Soderberg's death,
Constitutional encountered financial difficulties and hired the defendant,

at 1490; see Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 729 (3d Cir. 1983) (Garth, J.,
concurring) (recognizing express assignment rule). But see Lowry, 707 F.2d at 739 (Gibbons,
J., dissenting) (acknowledging rule of automatic assignment of section 10(b) causes of
action).
63. Nucorp, 772 F.2d at 1490.
64. Id. In addition to considering the plaintiffs' federal cause of action, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re Nucorp SecuritiesLitigation considered
whether the October-January debentureholders' state law claims against Continental for
breach of fiduciary duty, willful misconduct, fraud and deceit, and negligence automatically
transferred to the plaintiffs when the plaintiffs purchased the Nucorp debentures. Id. at
1492-93. The Ninth Circuit in Nucorp concluded that New York courts have determined
that state law claims do not travel automatically with securities when an individual purchases
a security. Id. at 1493. But see N.Y. [GEtEAL OBLIGATIONs] LAW § '13-107 (McKinney
1978) (transfer of bond vests in transferee all claims or demands of transferor for damages
or rescission); N.Y. [UNIFORM COMMERC . CODE] LAW § 8-301 (McKinney 1964) (with
respect to investment securities generally, upon delivery of security, purchaser acquires all
rights in security that transferor had or had authority to convey). Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit held that, under New York law, sellers of securities do not automatically assign
their federal causes of action to subsequent purchasers of the securities. Nucorp, 772 F.2d
at 1493.
65. Soderberg v. Gens, 652 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Ill. 1987); see infra notes 79-84 and
accompanying text (discussing reasoning and holding of court in Soderberg);see also Nucorp,
772 F.2d at 1493 (under New York law, sellers of securities do not automatically assign
federal causes of action to purchasers of their securities); supra notes 61-65 and accompanying
text (discussing reasoning and holding of court in Nucorp).
66. 652 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Ill 1987).
67. Soderberg v. Gens, 652 F. Supp. 560, 563 (N.D. I1l. 1987).
68. Id. at 561-62.
* 69. Id.
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Gens, as a management consultant. 70 Gens' investment advice to Constitutional consisted of a complex scheme for acquiring six new assets,
71
including the stock of two shell companies that Constitutional set up.
Although the Illinois Department of Insurance declared that Constitutional's stock purchases were inadmissible and ordered Constitutional to raise
additional capital to cover the investment that Gens had suggested, Constitutional continued to receive cash dividend checks from the two shell
companies. 72 Later, when the Soderbergs sold Copco and Constitutional,
the purchaser requested that the Soderbergs and the minority Copco
shareholders buy back the six assets from Copco. 73 The purchaser requested
that the shareholders buy back the assets because the purchaser did not
want to purchase the six new assets. 74 At the same time that Constitutional
repurchased the six assets, Constitutional assigned all claims, causes of
action, and rights arising out of the purchase, acquisition, or retention of
the six assets, including the stock in the shell companies, to the plaintiff,
the former controlling shareholder in Constitutional. 75 Pursuant to this
assignment, the plaintiff received dividend payments from the two shell
companies for three or four months after the sale of Copco and Constitutional. 76 Then, on September 26, 1984, the plaintiff announced that she
was rescinding the "purchase" of the two shell companies and refused to
accept any further dividend payments. 77 Alleging fraud in the sale of the
shell company stock under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the plaintiff in
Soderberg filed an action against Gens to rescind Constitutional's purchase
7
of stock from the shell companies. 1
In determining that Constitutional had not assigned to the plaintiff
the right to rescind the purchase of the stock of the shell companies, the
Soderberg court first recognized that a federal cause of action does not
attach automatically to a security and pass to a subsequent purchaser of

70. Id. at 562. In Soderberg a budding romantic involvement between the Soderbergs'
daughter, Janet, executive vice president of both Copco and Constitutional, and Timothy
Gens was instrumental in Constitutional's hiring of Gens as a management consultant. Id.
71. Id. In Soderberg v. Gens Constitutional ceased showing a profit in early 1983. Id.
The defendant, Gens, advised Constitutional to acquire six new assets. Id. Gens' plan
included the purchase of the stock of Constitutional shell corporations, Acquitech Corporation and Madison Professional Group. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. In Soderberg Constitutional received all proceeds from the sale of Copco,
including the plaintiff's share of the proceeds, so that Constitutional could repurchase the
six Constitutional assets that the purchaser of Copco and Constitutional did not want. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. In Soderberg, in addition to filing suit against Gens, the plaintiff also filed
suit against Acquitech and Madison, the shell companies that, under Gens' direction, had
sold their stock to Constitutional. Id. In addition to alleging fraud under the 1934 Act, the
plaintiff claimed a right of rescission under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, section 206 of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, two Illinois statutes, and common law fraud. Id.
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the security. 79 Next the Soderberg court acknowledged that the plaintiff
might have had a cause of action if Constitutional expressly had assigned
its right of rescission to the plaintiff, but rejected the plaintiff's argument
that Constitutional had done so.8 0 In rejecting the plaintiff's argument,
the Soderberg court noted that although some courts have recognized that
claims for damages are expressly assignable, according to the common
law of assignment, claims for rescission usually are not assignable.,'
Furthermore, the court noted that, even if the court recognized a rule of
express assignment, Constitutional's attempt to assign the right to rescind
was ineffective because Constitutional had relinquished its right to rescind.82 The Soderberg court explained that, by receiving and cashing
dividends that the shell companies had distributed, Continental had behaved in a manner that was inconsistent with an intention to retain the
right to rescind.83 Accordingly, in addition to holding that an owner of a
security does not automatically assign his cause of action to a subsequent
purchaser, the court concluded that Constitutional's attempt expressly to
assign the right to rescind to the plaintiff was ineffective.8
Consistently with the Nucorp and Soderberg courts, the majority of
courts in recent years has recognized that security holders do not automatically assign their federal securities law causes of action to subsequent
purchasers of their securities. 5 Although early opinions indicated that
federal securities fraud claims might be automatically assignable,86 recent
federal court decisions suggest a trend toward recognizing a theory of
87
express assignment and rejecting the concept of automatic assignment.

79. Id. at 563-64.
80. Id. at 564.
81. Id.at 565.
82. Id.
83. Id.at 566.
84. Id. The Soderberg court noted that the court's decision not to recognize automatic
assignability was limited to actions for rescission. Id.Therefore, the Soderberg court
acknowledged that the court did not decide whether all securities fraud actions are assignable.
Id.
85. See, e.g., Ciarlante v. CSX Corp., 629 F. Supp. 534, 537 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (federal
law does not provide for automatic assignment of federal securities laws claims); In re
Saxon Sec. Litig., 644 F. Supp. 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (assignment of rule 1Ob-5 right
of action to subsequent purchaser does not occur automatically); Rose v. Arkansas Valley
Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1188 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (because only defrauded
purchasers and sellers may bring actions under rule lOb-5, purchaser of security who does
not allege fraud does not acquire rule lOb-5 right of action by automatic assignment);
Independent Investor Protective League v. Saunders, 64 F.R.D. 564, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(right of action that belongs to victim of fraud does not attach automatically to security).
86. See, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Shields & Co., 209 F.
Supp. 145, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (rule lOb-5 actions for remedial damages are assignable);
Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 761-62 (D.N.J. 1955) (because remedial damages
actions survive death of holder, rule 10b-5 remedial damages action is assignable); infra
notes 100-05 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning and holding of Mills v. Sarjem
Corp. court).
87. See, e.g., Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 729 (3d Cir.) (Garth, J.,
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A few courts, however, have not joined the recent trend of the federal
courts, but instead have recognized a theory that a seller automatically
assigns his securities fraud action to a subsequent buyer. 8 The decisions
of courts that recognize a theory of automatic assignment, however, are
distinguishable in several respects from the majority position rejecting the
theory of automatic assignment. 89 For example, in Phelan v. Middle States

Oil Corp.90 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

considered whether executors of a deceased bondholder's estate could
assert the cause of action of the original bondholder. 9' The original
bondholder, who sold the bonds to the decedent, had a cause of action

against the receiver of a bankrupt issuing company for the receiver's
fraudulent actions. 92 The Phelan court concluded that a cause of action

against a receiver that arises from fraud automatically travels with a bond

from the seller to the purchaser of the bond. 93 Although the Phelan court
recognized a theory of automatic assignment of fraud claims, the Phelan

concurring) (owners of securities expressly may assign rule lOb-5 causes of action), modification denied, 711 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983); In re Saxon

Sec. Litig., 644 F. Supp. 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting in dictum that although rule
10b-5 claims are not automatically assignable, rule lOb-5 claims may be expressly assignable
in limited circumstances); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180,
1188 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (security owner must do something in addition to selling security to
assign rule lOb-5 cause of action to purchaser of security); cf. Independent Investor Protective
League v. Saunders, 64 F.R.D. 564, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (seller expressly may transfer chose
in action to buyer).
88. See Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 154 F.2d 978, 1001 (2d Cir. 1946) (executrix
of estate could maintain decedent's securities law cause of action); International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (original
owners of bonds automatically assigned to plaintiffs original owners' right of action against
defendant for fraudulent misrepresentation); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 762
(D.N.J. 1955) (executors of decedent's estate could maintain decedent's securities law cause
of action).
89. See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text (discussing courts' reasoning and
holdings in Phelan and Mills).

90. 154 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1946).
91. Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 154 F.2d 978, 988 (2d Cir. 1946).
92. See id. (executors of bondholder's estate in receivership proceedings against defendant corporation charged receivers of corporation with fraud). In Phelan the plaintiff's
husband before his death purchased the bonds of United, a subsidiary of a bankrupt
corporation. Id. at 988. When the plaintiff's husband presented the United bonds for
payment under the parent company's bankruptcy reorganization plan, the plaintiff's husband
received a liquidating distribution. Id. The plaintiff, as executrix of her husband's estate,
made a motion in the receivership proceedings against the defendant corporation for a
compulsory accounting by the receivers. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the receiver of the
bankrupt corporation fraudulently reported the assets and liabilities of the corporation and
that the liquidating distribution price of the United bonds was fraudulently low. Id. In
determining whether the receivers of Middle States Oil Corporation had acted fraudulently,
the Second Circuit considered whether the.original bondholder's cause of action passed
automatically to the decedent bondholder upon the decedent's purchase of the bonds. Id.
at 999.
93. Id. at 1000-02.
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decision is distinguishable from the decisions that have not recognized
automatic assignment.9 4 First, Phelan was a bankruptcy case involving a
fraud claim under tort law, not federal securities law. 95 Second, the Second
Circuit in Phelan emphasized the fiduciary nature of a federal receiver's
position. 96 The Phelan court noted that a receiver, as an "arm of the
court," is under the highest kind of fiduciary duty to act fairly and
openly. 97 The court concluded, therefore, that a rule of express assignment
would limit the ability of the federal courts to hold federal receivers to
their strict duty of accountability2 In promoting a policy of strict accountability of federal receivers, the Second Circuit in Phelan, in determining that fraud claims are automatically assignable, considered a policy
that is not relevant to actions under the securities statutes. 99
A second decision that authorities cite for the rule of automatic
assignability of securities law claims, although not concerning the accountability of federal receivers, is also distinguishable from the decisions that
have not recognized automatic assignment. 00 In Mills v. Sarjem Corp.101
the plaintiffs, executors of the decedent plaintiff's estate, alleged that the
defendant corporation, of which the decedent plaintiff had been a stockholder, conspired to purchase the stock of another company in violation
of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5.' 0 2 The plaintiffs in Mills, seeking damages
03
under rule lOb-5, moved to substitute themselves in the decedent's action.'
In Mills the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted the plaintiffs' motion to substitute the executors of the plaintiff's
estate for the deceased plaintiff. 0 4 Without distinguishing between express
and automatic assignment, the District Court in Mills noted that remedial
damages actions under rule lOb-5 are neither personal nor penal in nature
and, therefore, that rule lOb-5 remedial damages actions survive the
security holder's death and are assignable. 0 5 The decision in Mills, like
94. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing factors that distinguish
Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp. from decisions not recognizing automatic assignment).
95. See Phelan, 154 F.2d at 988 (plaintiffs moved for compulsory accounting in
receivership proceeding, alleging fraud and irregularities in connection with receivership).
96. See id. at 1000-02 (rejecting state rule of express assignment of fraud claims
because of special nature of receiver's fiduciary duty).
97. Id. at 991.
98. See id. at 1000-01 (state rules of express assignment should not hamper federal
courts in holding receivers, as officers of court, to high standard of accountability).
99. Id. at 1000-01. In Phelan v. Middles States Oil Corp. the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit stressed the importance of strict accountability for federal
receivers of bankrupt estates. Id. at 1001. Because of a strong federal policy protecting
victims of the fraudulent activity of federal receivers, the Phelan court allowed the plaintiff
to recover against the receiver corporation. Id.
100. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (discussing decision in Mills v.
Sarjem Corp.);
101. 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
102. Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 762 (D.N.J. 1955).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 761.
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the decision in Phelan, is distinguishable from the decisions that do not
recognize automatic assignment of securities fraud actions. 0 6 First, the
district court decided Mills before the United States Supreme Court in
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores determined that only defrauded
purchasers or sellers of securities may maintain rule 10b-5 actions. 0 7
Because the Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip effectively overruled
Mills,1
c0 the Mills court's reasoning that the executors of the plaintiff's

estate could maintain the plaintiff's remedial damages action does not
support a rule permitting the automatic assignment of securities fraud
claims. 0 9 Second, the Mills court's reasoning does not support the automatic assignability of securities fraud claims because, by providing an

action to individuals uninjured by fraud, the Mills court defeated the
policy underlying section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, of protecting victims of
fraud from deceptive and manipulative practices." 0 Finally, the plaintiffs
in Mills were not subsequent purchasers of securities who deliberately may
have purchased the securities to benefit from the previous owners' fraud
claims."' Rather, the plaintiffs in Mills and Phelan wished to substitute
themselves as executors of a decedent's estate in the decedent's action
against the defendant." 2 Many authorities assert, as an exception to the

106. See infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text (discussing facts that distinguish
Mills v. Sarjem Corp. from decisions that have not recognized automatic assignment).
107. Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N;J. 1955); see also Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (only actual purchasers and sellers of securities

may maintain actions under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5); infra notes 116-22 and accompanying
text (discussing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores).
108. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (only actual
purchasers and sellers of securities may maintain actions under section 10(b) and rule 10b-

5); see also infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text (discussing facts and United States
Supreme Court's holding in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores).
109. Compare Mills, 133 F. Supp. at 761 (because actions for remedial damages at
common law survive death of holder, original security holder assigned rule lOb-5 action to
executors of original security holder's estate) with Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 733-37 (in enacting
securities statutes, Congress ensured that only purchasers and sellers of securities would be
able to maintain securities law claims).
110. See Mills, 133 F. Supp. at 761 (because actions for remedial damages at common
law survive death of holder, original security holder assigned rule lOb-5 action to executors
of original security holder's estate); see also S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934)
(purpose of 1934 Act was to provide remedy for investors that suffered injury from unfair
methods of speculation in securities transactions prior to and during stock market crash).
111. See Mills, 133 F. Supp. at 761 (plaintiffs were executors of decedent stockholder's
estate).
112. See id. (executors of estate moved to be substituted as plaintiffs in decedent's
securities fraud action against corporation); see also Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 154
F.2d 978, 990 (2d Cir. 1946) (plaintiff, widow of original bondholder, requested that court
substitute plaintiff, as executrix of decedent bondholder's estate, in decedent bondholder's
rule lOb-5 action).
In addition to the decisions in Mills and Phelan, the decision in InternationalLadies'
Garment Workers' Union v. Shields & Co. to recognize the automatic assignability of federal
securities fraud claims also is distinguishable from decisions rejecting the automatic assign-
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express assignment rule, that a rule lOb-5 cause of action does not abate

upon a security holder's death, but instead, passes to the executor of the
3

security holder's estate."
In addition to the distinctions between the decisions supporting an
automatic assignment rule and the decisions recognizing only a rule of
express assignment, several policy considerations, as well as the common
law of assignment, further support rejecting a rule of automatic assignment.114 In recent years, the federal courts carefully have defined the policy
and purpose behind the securities regulations laws." 5 For example, in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores"6 the United States Supreme Court

established that only actual purchasers and sellers of securities may bring
private damages actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5." 7 In deter-

ment rule. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp.
145 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In Shields the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York considered whether subsequent purchasers of bonds could assert the previous
bondholders' claim of reliance on the allegedly false representations of the defendants. Id.
at 149. In determining whether the previous bondholders had assigned their rights of action
to the plaintiffs, the Shields court relied upon the district court's reasoning in Mills. Id. at
149-50. The Shields court noted that the plaintiffs in Shields requested remedial relief. Id.
In accordance with the decision in Mills, the Shields court reasoned that, because other
courts have ruled that actions for remedial damages are assignable, the original owners of
the bonds automatically had assigned to the plaintiffs the original owners' rights of action
against the defendant for fraudulent misrepresentation. Id.; see Mills, 133 F. Supp. at 762
(because actions for remedial damages at common law survive death of holder, original
security holder assigned rule 10b-5 action to executors of original security holder's estate).
Like the court in Mills, the Shields court decided Shields before the United States Supreme
Court enunciated the policy behind rule lOb-5 of protecting defrauded investors from
manipulative and deceptive practices. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v.
Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Mills, 133 F. Supp. at 762; see Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728-29 (Congress enacted securities
statutes to protect investors from fraudulent practices of speculators); supra notes 1-2 and
accompanying text (by enacting securities statutes in 1930s, Congress was reacting to abuse
of securities markets by dealers and underwriters that resulted in injury to investors).
Accordingly, the Shields court's reliance on the Mills decision in recognizing a rule of
automatic assignment does not support a rule permitting the automatic assignment of federal
securities law claims. Shields, 209 F. Supp. at 149-50. Additionally, in Shields the plaintiffs'
predecessors in title to the bonds "duly assigned" to the plaintiffs all of the predecessors'
rights, titles, and interests in the bonds. Shields, 209 F. Supp. at 149. Although the Shields
court did not elaborate on the predecessors' apparently express assignment to the plaintiffs,
the decision of the Shields court may represent approval only of an express assignment rule
and give no support to an automatic assignment rule. Id.
113. See In re Saxon Sec. Litig., 644 F. Supp. 465, 471 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (cases in
which decedent's estate claimed right to maintain decedent's action do not support general
proposition that securities law claims are automatically assignable).
114. See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text (discussing policy considerations
behind federal securities law and common law of assignment).
115. See infra notes 116-24 and accompanying text (discussing cases defining policy
behind securities laws).
116. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
117. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975). In Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores the United States Supreme Court considered whether
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mining that only actual purchase, s or sellers may bring rule lob-5 actions,
the Supreme Court relied upon Congress' intent in enacting the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.118 The Supreme

Court in Blue Chip noted that the congressional intent to permit only
defrauded purchasers or sellers of securities to recover damages for se-

curities fraud is evident in the phrasing of section 10(b). 119 Comparing the
phrasing of section 10(b) to the phrasing of other provisions of the 1933
Act and the 1934 Act, the Supreme Court noted that the 1933 Act, in

sections other than section 10(b), provides remedies for parties other than
the actual purchasers or sellers of securities. 20 The Supreme Court exofferees of a stock offering, who neither purchased nor sold the offered shares, could
maintain a private cause of action based on the offeror's alleged violation of rule lob-5.
Id. at 725. In Blue Chip the United States, under an antitrust reorganization plan, required
New Blue Chip, a company that sold trading stamps to retailers, to offer shares of Blue
Chip common stock to retailers who were not shareholders of Blue Chip prior to the antitrust
action. Id. at 725-26. New Blue Chip registered the offering and distributed a prospectus to
the offerees in accordance with the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 726. Manor Drug Stores,
representing a class of plaintiff-offerees, filed a complaint alleging that New Blue Chip
phrased its prospectus in an intentionally negative manner to discourage the offerees from
accepting the offer of common stock, in violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id. at
726-27. Manor Drug Stores' complaint alleged further that, by discouraging the offerees
from accepting the offer, New Blue Chip could reserve the shares for a subsequent public
offering at a higher price. Id. at 727. The United States District Court for the Central
District of California dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which a
court could grant relief. See id. (discussing district court's disposition of Blue Chip). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the holding of the district
court, finding that Manor Drug Stores, although neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities,
could maintain a cause of action under rule lOb-5. See id. at 727 (discussing appellate
disposition of Blue Chip). The defendants appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit to the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. The Supreme Court
granted Blue Chip Stamps' petition for writ of certiorari. Id. at 723. The Supreme Court
in Blue Chip determined that the purchaser-seller requirement for actions under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 is a sound, well-supported requirement. Id. at 737-49. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit in Blue Chip. Id.; see infra
notes 119-22 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's reasoning in Blue Chip);
see also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.) (only actual purchasers
and sellers of securities may maintain private actions under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
118. See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 727-29 (reviewing congressional intent in enacting
securities laws).
119. Id. In its decision in Blue Chip, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that
the wording of rule lOb-5 prohibiting fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale" of
securities, and the lack of evidence of a congressional intent to provide a remedy under
section 10(b) to parties other than defrauded purchasers or sellers of securities supported
limiting recovery under rule lOb-5 to actual purchasers and sellers. Id.; see supra notes 1-2
and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of section 10(b)).
120. See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 733-37 (when Congress intended to provide remedy to
individuals other than purchasers and sellers of securities, Congress expressly provided
remedy); see also Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982), as amended by Act of Aug.
10, 1954, 68 Stat. 686 (providing that any person who in offer or sale of securities acts
fraudulently shall act unlawfully); Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77bb(a) (1982) (limiting
recovery in any private damages action under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to persons
who have suffered actual damages).
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plained that if Congress had intended to provide the remedies in section
10(b) to parties that were neither injured purchasers nor injured sellers of
securities, Congress expressly would have provided the remedies in the
phrasing of section 10(b).12' In interpreting section 10(b) and rule lOb-5,
the Supreme Court concluded, therefore, that Congress intended to provide
a remedy only for defrauded purchasers and sellers of securities. 22 Courts
that have addressed the issue of assignment of rule lOb-5 actions since the
Supreme Court's decision establishing the purchaser-seller requirement
have recognized that a rule of automatic assignment of securities fraud
actions under rule lOb-5 would be inconsistent with the congressional
policy underlying section 10(b). 12 s These courts have rejected the rule of

automatic assignment in securities fraud cases because the rule would
reward parties who have not suffered fraud but, on the contrary, may
have planned their investments carefully to take advantage of a defrauded
party's legal claim.' l 4
In addition to the policy that underlies the securities fraud action, the

common law of assignment supports the rejection of the rule of automatic
assignment of securities fraud claims and the acceptance of the rule of

121. See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 733-34 (comparing phrasing of § 10(b) to wording of
both antifraud provision of 1933 Act and § 28(a) of 1934 Act, and concluding that Congress
intended to limit right to recover rule lOb-5 damages to actual purchasers and sellers of
securities).
122. See id. at 733-37 (holding that only purchasers and sellers may maintain claims
under securities acts); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180,
1188-89 ,V.D. Mo. 1983) (recognizing in United States Supreme Court's decision in Blue
Chip underlying premise that Congress intended that only defrauded purchasers and sellers
may bring actions under rule lOb-5).
123. See In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 772 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1985) (rule of
automatic assignment fails to provide remedy to individual for whom securities acts provide
remedy); Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 729 (3d Cir.) (Garth, J., concurring)
(automatic assignment rule contravenes congressional intent underlying securities laws by
unjustly depriving injured security holders of right to recover and granting right to recover
instead to subsequent purchasers who sustained no injury), modification denied, 711 F.2d
1207 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983); Independent Investor Protective League v.
Saunders, 64 F.R.D. 564, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (automatic assignment rule contravenes
congressional policy underlying securities acts that only injured party may recover under
securities acts).
124. See Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 733 (recognizing that wording of § 10(b) provides
remedy for investors that have suffered injury in connection with purchase or sale of
securities); In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 772 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1985) (rule of
automatic assignment fails to provide remedy to individual for whom securities acts provide
remedy); Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 729 (3d Cir.) (Garth, J., concurring)
(automatic assignment rule contravenes congressional intent underlying securities laws by
unjustly depriving injured security holders of right to recover and granting right to recover
instead to subsequent purchasers who sustained no injury), modification denied, 711 F.2d
1207 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983); Independent Investor Protective League v.
Saunders, 64 F.R.D. 564, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (automatic assignment rule would contravene
congressional policy underlying securities acts that only injured party may recover under
securities acts).
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express assignment. 25 At commcn law, choses in action, which are legal
rights that are enforceable in a ,uit at law, are assignable if the chose is
neither personal nor penal in nature. 126 Because a rule lOb-5 action is
neither personal nor penal in nature, early decisions relying on the assignability of choses in action held that remedial damages actions under rule
10b-5 were assignable. 127 The traditional common law rule of assignment,
however, required that, to assign his rights effectively, a party clearly
must evidence his intent to assign his rights to a second party. 2 The
common law practice of determining assignment from the intent of the
parties, therefore, suggests that if rule lOb-5 actions are assignable, a
security holder expressly must assign his cause of action to a subsequent
29
holder for the assignment to be effective.
Along with policy and common law support for a rule of express
assignment, other considerations support the rejection of the automatic
assignment rule and acceptance of the express assignment rule. a0 Proponents of the automatic assignment rule contend that the automatic assignment of rule lOb-5 claims adequately serves the policy behind section 10(b)
of protecting security holders from manipulative or deceptive practices in
securities transactions.' The proponents reason that because automatic
assignment ensures that either a defrauded party or his successor may
bring a rule lOb-5 claim to court, the rule of automatic assignment
13 2
advances the policy behind section 10(b) of protecting security holders.
125. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing common law of assignment).
126. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments §§ 27-29 (1963) (only choses in action that are
not assignable are torts for personal injuries and for wrongs to person, reputation, or
feelings).
127. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp.
145, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (because remedial actions are assignable at common law, remedial
action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 is assignable); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753,
761 (D.N.J. 1955) (same); supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (discussing Mills).
128. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 1 (1963) (evidence of intent to assign defines
legal assignment); see Russell v. Texas Consolidated Oils, 120 F. Supp. 508, 512-13 (D.C.N.M.
1954) (without evidence of intent to bind by assignment, court cannot recognize attempted
assignment).
129. See Note, Express Versus Automatic Assignment of Section 10(b) Causes of Action,
1985 DUKE L.J. 813, 823 (1985) (rule of express assignment of § 10(b) causes of action is
consistent with common law practice of examining parties' intent to determine whether
assignment has occurred).
130. See infra notes 131-50 and accompanying text (discussing further support for rule
of express assignment).
131. See Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 740-41 (3d Cir. 1983) (Gibbons,
J., dissenting) (because autounatic assignment rule ensures, through free transfer of claims,
that one security holder will maintain cause of action, automatic assignment rule achieves
Congress' policy of protecting security holders from manipulative or deceptive acts of
securities sellers).
132. See id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (if victims of securities fraud freely may sell
securities and causes of action on market, subsequent purchaser will maintain action and
accomplish goal of securities law of combating manipulative and deceptive practices in
securities transactions).
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This argument, however, assumes that the victim of fraud wishes to assign
his rule lOb-5 cause of action to a subsequent purchaser.3 3 Of course, a
victim that does not wish to assign his right of action to a purchaser
expressly could provide that the right of action does not pass with the
sale of the security. 34 In the absence of an express reservation of rights,
however, assuming that the cause of action arose prior to the sale, a court
which determined that a cause of action automatically traveled with the
sale of a security would confer the cause of action upon a second party
that has suffered no injury.135 In contrast, a rule allowing the express
assignment of rule lOb-5 causes of action would respect the intentions of
a selling party who expressly transferred his cause of action to a subsequent
36
purchaser. 1
In addition to arguing that an automatic assignment rule respects the
congressional intent behind the securities statutes, proponents of the au-

133. See id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (under automatic assignment rule, securities law
causes of action automatically travel with securities to subsequent purchasers of securities,
regardless of original owners' wishes).
134. See 6 AM. Jus. 2D Assignments § 1 (1963) (evidence of intent to assign defines
legal assignment).
135. See Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 729 (3d Cir. 1983) (Garth, J.,
concurring) (automatic assignment rule tends to reward uninjured security holders by
gratuitously transferring causes of action to them); In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 772
F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1985) (rule of automatic assignment gratuitously transfers cause
of action to person who has not suffered fraud); Independent Investor Protective League
v. Saunders, 64 F.R.D. 564, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (automatic assignment rule deprives injured
person of cause of action and gives cause of action to person that is simply shrewd or
lucky).
136. See Note, supra note 129, at 831 (in faceless market, only requirement that security
holder express his intent to assign his cause of action to subsequent purchaser will support
security holder's intent). Proponents of the automatic assignment rule fail to respect a
security holder's intent when transferring his security. Id. Accordingly, in assuming that the
seller transfers both his property and the rights incident to the property, proponents of the
automatic assignment rule fail to consider the common law distinction between the transfer
of property and the transfer of rights arising from property ownership. See id. at 828
(dissent in Lowry overlooked distinction between transfer of property and transfer of
property rights); see also Lowry, 707 F.2d at 741 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (holding that
seller of security automatically assigns seller's cause of action to subsequent purchasers of
security, without mentioning seller's intent). An express assignment rule would enable the
assignment of securities law claims to transpire in the same way that the assignment of
rights of action for breach of warranty transpires. Note, supra note 129, at 828. A seller
of property does not automatically assign his right of action for breach of warranty, because
the sale of the property does not necessarily indicate that the seller intended to relinquish
his cause of action for breach of warranty. Id. In the breach of warranty situation, in
accordance with the common law of assignment, the law recognizes that a seller's intent
determines whether or not he assigned his right of action in his property to a subsequent
purchaser. Id. A court determining whether a seller of a security automatically assigned his
cause of action to a subsequent purchaser of the security has no more reason than a court
reviewing the assignment of a right of action for breach of warranty to assume that the
seller intended to assign his cause of action. Id. Thus, because an express assignment rule
respects the intent of the seller of a security, an express assignment rule most effectively
accords with the common law of assignment. Id.
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tomatic assignment rule claim that, in the anonymous securities market in
which parties conduct most transfers without ever meeting, a rule requiring
transferors expressly to assign their rule lob-5 rights to transferees is
impractical.1 37 The proponents, however, fail to recognize that although
the securities market is usually anonymous, buyers and sellers operate
through intermediary securities brokers.' 38 Because these brokers arrange
all other terms of purchase agreements, they also may arrange for an
express provision that the seller's lob-5 right of action will pass with the
1 39
security that he is selling to other investors.
Proponents of a rule of automatic assignment also contend that a rule
of automatic assignment allows the party that is most likely to discover
the fraud to pursue a fraud claim.40 The proponents reason that, because
security holders often sell their securities before discovering that they have
a rule lob-5 claim, a rule of automatic assignment permits the adjudication
of claims that a holder could not maintain under a rule of express
assignment if the seller sold his securities prior to discovering his rule lOb5 cause of action.' 4' The rule's supporters conclude that, by recognizing
a rule of automatic assignment, courts more effectively will deter manip42
ulative and deceptive practices in securities transactions.
The arguments of the proponents of a rule of automatic assignment
are convincing in the context of only one particular scenario. 43 In most
instances, when an investor sells his security before discovering that he
has a rule lOb-5 claim, the express assignment rule still will accomplish
the policy goals behind the securities laws. 44 Under an express assignment
rule, when the original security holder discovers that he had a rule lob-5
claim, if he neither expressly nor automatically assigned his cause of action
to the purchaser of his security, the original holder still may be able to
4
If
maintain an action based on his previous ownership of the security.
137. See Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 746 (3d Cir. 1983) (Seitz, J.,
dissenting) (in faceless securities market, express assignment rule is impractical); see supra
notes 36-49 and accompanying text (discussing dissenters' opinions in Lowry).
138. See Note, supra note 129, at 824 (buyers and sellers routinely agree on details of
securities transactions through intermediary brokers).
139. See id. (whether seller of security assigns seller's cause of action to buyer of
security is contractual term, upon which buyer and seller can agree through broker).
140. Lowry v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 746 (3d Cir. 1983) (Seitz, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text (discussing dissenters' opinion in
Lowry that because securities law claims do not always arise quickly, purchaser of security
is more likely than original holder to discover original holder's claim).
141. See Lowry, 707 F.2d at 746 (Seitz, J., dissenting) (automatic assignment rule
advances remedial purpose of securities laws by placing securities law claim with person
most likely to learn of existence of claim).
142. See id. (courts will deter manipulative practices in securities trading by placing
securities law claim with person most likely to discover claim).
143. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for failure of
arguments of proponents of automatic assignment rule).
144. See Note, supra note 129, at 827 (express assignment rule accomplishes purposes
of § 10(b) at least as well as automatic assignment rule). 145. Id.
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the original holder expressly does assign his rights to a subsequent pur46
chaser of the security, the subsequent purchaser can maintain an action.1
However, assuming an efficient capital market, if the subsequent purchaser
of the security is injured by the fraud when the price of his stock goes
down in reaction to the news of the fraud, then he probably has no right
of action against the issuer of the security. 47 Thus, an express assignment
rule only advances the policy and purpose underlying the securities laws
if the cause of action against the issuer of the security has become public
knowledge.' 4 As a result, a rule of automatic assignment seems preferable
in those instances in which the subsequent purchaser of a security suffers
injury from the fraudulent acts of the issuer against the previous owner
of the security.' 49
The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of the assignability
of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 causes of action in recent years has rejected
the concept of automatic assignment in favor of a rule that allows only
the express assignment of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 causes of -action.50
These courts have founded their decisions on the traditions of the-common
law of assignment and the United States Supreme Court's recent interpretations of the policy underlying federal securities law. 151 Furthermore,
these courts have determined that a rule of express assignment most
effectively advances the policy behind the federal securities laws of protecting investors from deceptive and manipulative practices by preventing
uninjured investors from maintaining claims to which they are not entitled.152 Only a few courts have recognized a rule of automatic assignment
and these decisions either differ factually from the decisions rejecting the
automatic assignment rule or precede the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.1 3 Although the

146. Id.
147. See id., n.91 (in Lowry cause of action against B & 0 for fraud had become
public knowledge and plaintiff knew of cause of action, in which case express assignment
rule is most appropriate).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 9, 52-84, 87 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning and
holdings of courts announcing express assignment rule-in federal securities law cases).
151. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975) (lack of
evidence of congressional intent to provide remedy under section 10(b) to parties other then
defrauded purchasers or sellers of securities supports limiting recovery under rule lOb-5 to
actual purchasers and sellers); supra notes 9, 52-84, 87 and accompanying text (discussing
reasoning and holdings of courts announcing express assignment rule in federal securities
law cases); supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing common law of assignment); supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text (discussing Blue Chip Court's analysis of
congressional intent underlying securities laws).
152. See supra notes 9, 52-84, 87 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning and
holdings of courts announcing that express assignment rule in federal securities law promotes
policy underlying federal securities laws); supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (discussing policy underlying securities laws).
153. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975); see supra
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federal courts of appeals have failed to enunciate a clear rule on the
assignment of federal securities law causes of action, 5 4 the noticeable trend

toward rejecting the concept of automatic assignment of federal securities
fraud claims is well supported and, except in the case of the injured

subsequent purchaser, in the future, should provide a clear precedential
rule for securities investors.' 55
MELISSA

J.

HALSTEAD-WHITE

notes 89-113 and accompanying text (discussing distinguishing factors of cases in which
courts have recognized rule of express assignmetlt); supra notes 117-22 and accompanying
text (discussing reasoning of Supreme Court in Blue Chip).
154. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting opinions among
federal courts regarding question of assignment of securities claims).
155. See supra notes 85-149 and accompanying text (discussing arguments in support
of express assignment rule).

